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The Hague Evidence Convention: Its
Impact on American Civil Procedure
JAMES S. MCLEAN*
I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
At a time when the world is experiencing increased international
travel and commerce,' international litigation2 is understandably be-
coming a common occurrence in the United States courts. 3 Whether
one looks to recent product liability litigation, 4 current antitrust liti-
gation, 5 or criminal investigations conducted by federal agencies, 6 for-
eign evidence is sought by United States litigants with more frequency
from all corners of the globe.
A problem that has frequently confronted the American Bar in
the discovery of evidence abroad is the hostile opposition of foreign
litigants and their countries to American methods of pre-trial discov-
* A.B., 1969, Gonzaga University; M.Ed., 1974, Gonzaga University; J.D., 1975, Gon-
zaga University School of Law; Candidate for L.L.M., Georgetown University Law Center.
Member, Washington Bar. Mr. McLean practices law in Spokane, Washington for Johnson &
McLean.
1. See Statistical Abstract of the United States 880, Table No. 1545 (1982-83). Between
1975 and 1981, world imports increased 123%, world exports increased 125%, United States
imports increased 163%, and United States exports increased 116%. Id.; Statistical Abstract
of the United States 909, Table No. 1523 (1977). See also Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862,
868 (D.C. Cir. 1981). At the end of 1983 the volume of United States investment abroad
totaled $226 billion. U. S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, August
1984, at 29. Direct foreign investment in the United States amounted to $135 billion. Id. at
27.
2. The statement in this paper "international litigation" refers to civil litigation with a
foreign party.
3. See United States v. Strong, 608 F. Supp. 188, 193 (D.C. Pa. 1985), where the judge
commented that "there has been an explosion of civil litigation involving foreign entities in
recent years."; see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 385 (Rev. Tent. Draft. No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
4. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr.
874 (1982); Pierburg GMBH and Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 876 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1983); In re
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 119 (1983). United States v. Marc Rich, 707 F.2d 663 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983).
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ery. 7 This opposition is not limited to civil law countries s but appar-
ently has reached almost unanimous opposition in other developed
democracies. 9
It is against this backdrop that the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial matters was con-
ceived and negotiated.' 0 Even though the Convention was intended
to facilitate international discovery by United States litigants, it has
received a cool reception from American courts, 1 especially at the
federal level.' 2 This chilly reception by the federal bench, together
with the decision of the United States Supreme Court to stay on the
sidelines,13 has precipitated substantial disarray in the current judicial
treatment of the Hague Evidence Convention by United States
courts. 14
7. United States litigants' attempts to discover documents abroad have been the subject
of the most opposition and controversy:
No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial fron-
tier of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the request for docu-
ments associated with the investigation and litigation in the United States. Some 15
states as of 1984 have adopted legislation expressly designed to counter U.S. efforts to
secure production of documents situated outside the United States; other states, such
as Switzerland, have had bank and business secrecy laws in effect for longer periods
and not directed specifically against the United States.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 437 reporters note
no. 1 at 333 (Rev. Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
8. It is evident that the United States discovery process is unique in the world regardless
of the characterization of a country's legal system:
On top of this, foreign rules of discovery tend to be considerably more restrictive
than their American counterparts. For example, foreign jurisdictions generally allow
discovery only of matters that would be admissible at trial; the American practice of
allowing the discovery of facts which may in turn lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence is condemned as authorizing "fishing expeditions." Also, in contrast to the
American practice, a foreign court is not likely to require a local parent to produce
the records of its foreign subsidiaries. As a general matter, the trial judge will strictly
supervise all aspects of the discovery process, applying the "blue pencil" to requests
that wander from narrow bounds.
2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 1510 at
227 (2d ed. 1981).
9. See generally Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, Two Cheers for the ALI Restatement's Provi-
sions on Foreign Discovery, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1075 (1984).
10. The Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, opened for signature, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444
[hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention or Convention].
11. See infra text accompanying notes 113-151.
12. See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co. GMBH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), petition for
cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3084 (1985).
13. See, e.g., Club Mediterranee, S.A. v. Dorin, 469 U.S. 913 (1984). But see infra note
134 and accompanying text.
14. See 1 B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMER-
CIAL) § 5-40, at 256.1 (1984).
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This paper will attempt to bring some order to this disorder by
applying accepted principles of international law to the application
and interpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention.15 Given the
variety of legal systems in the world, and recognizing that other sys-
tems do not recognize pre-trial discovery as we practice it, the inevita-
ble conclusion is that the Hague Evidence Convention was intended
to provide the exclusive procedures in the discovery of evidence lo-
cated in signatory nations.
II. THE PROBLEM OF THE DISCOVERY OF EVIDENCE
LOCATED ABROAD
A. Comparative Legal Systems
Procedures for conducting pre-trial discovery of evidence in for-
eign countries varies from country to country and is dependent upon
the type of legal system found in each respective country. Whether a
country characterizes its legal system as civil law, common law, so-
cialist, or Muslim, the different procedures for pre-trial discovery vary
greatly. 16 For example, civil law countries use the inquisitorial
method to obtain oral evidence, unlike the adversarial system used in
the United States. 17 Thus, the questioning of witnesses is undertaken
by the judge.
In Germany, the judge is given expansive powers to obtain evi-
dence.18  "It is the judge who determines which witnesses are to be
heard, [and] which documents.., are to be produced .... ,,19 Indeed,
after a suit is instituted, all proceedings that follow are in effect parts
of the trial, which are conducted as a series of evidentiary hearings. 20
The trial is not viewed as a separate proceeding distinct from the rest
of the suit.
In civil law nations, witnesses are not necessarily placed under
oath before they testify and cross-examination is typically unknown.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 185-232.
16. SEIDEL, EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, PRAC-
TICING LAW INSTITUTE 22-23 (1984); O'Kane, Taking Depositions Abroad. The Problems
Still Remain, 31 FED. INS. CONS. 343, 345 (1981).
17. Note, Taking Evidence Outside of the United States, 55 B.U.L. REV. 368, 373 n.37
(1975).
18. Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Impact of
the Hague Evidence Convention on German-American Judicial Cooperation, 17 INT'L LAW.
465, 466 (1983).
19. Id.
20. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 398 (4th ed. 1980).
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Evidence taken by the judge automatically becomes part of the record
and expert testimony is done through court appointed experts which
results in testimony of very high regard. 2' Pre-trial discovery as
known in common law countries, especially the procedures utilized in
the United States, is virtually unheard of. Even in common law coun-
tries no system of evidence gathering resembles that of the United
States:
In most common law countries, even England, one must often look
hard to find the resemblances between pre-trial discovery there and
pre-trial discovery in the U.S. In England, for example, although
document discovery is available, depositions do not exist, interrog-
atories have strictly limited use, and discovery of third parties is
not generally allowed.
22
The differences between discovery in the United States and other
countries are numerous; to paraphrase one commentator's analysis:
1. Many countries have no pre-trial discovery as known in the
United States;
2. Certain discovery devices such as depositions may not be allowed
at all;
3. The scope of pre-trial discovery in other countries may be very
narrow and much more limited than that allowed in the United
States;
4. Document demands may be strictly confined to specific requests;
and
5. Rules of procedure while conducting discovery may vary enor-
mously. For example, depositions may not be transcribed verbatim. 23
Thus, it is these different methods of discovery utilized by vari-
ous legal systems that create the conflict between the system of dis-
covery in the United States and legal systems in the rest of the world.
If United States litigants choose to ignore foreign methods of evidence
gathering and seek to superimpose their system upon foreign litigants
and foreign legal systems, this conflict is exacerbated. The conflict is
especially acute in civil law nations where all judicial acts, including
the taking of testimony and the inspection of documents, are viewed
as public acts to be performed by the courts.24 Since only a sovereign
can perform public acts, it is considered an infringement upon a na-
21. Id. at 413.
22. Seidel, supra note 16, at 24.
23. Id. at 25-27.
24. Carter, Obtaining Foreign Discovery and Evidence for Use in Litigation in the United
States: Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 INT'L LAW. 5, 6-7 (1979).
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tion's "Judicial Sovereignty" for a private party to engage in acts such
as evidence gathering.25 All countries want their sovereignty to be
respected and their legal system viewed as civilized. As one commen-
tator put it, for United States litigants and United States courts to
disregard the sovereignty of another nation in the area of evidence
gathering is acute naivete:
U.S. Courts are not so naive as to think only the results of the U.S.
system of justice are fair and the others are barbaric and must be
ignored. Rather, the United States recognized the validity of other
countries' systems of justice in many ways by, for example, enforc-
ing certain foreign judgments and foreign arbitration awards here;
giving certain res judicata effect here to foreign litigation; enforcing
certain forum selection clauses requiring litigation in other coun-
tries; and dismissing litigation here on the basis that, under princi-
ples of forum non conveniens, a case should be tried in another
country. On the other hand, the U.S. favors its system of discov-
ery, sometimes unduly.
26
It was the recognition of this conflict that caused the United
States to join the Hague Conference on Private International Law in
1964. At that time, the United States apparently recognized the need
to reconcile, on the international plane, this conflict between United
States litigants and foreign parties. The involvement of the United
States with the Hague Conference resulted in its becoming a signatory
to several multilateral judicial assistance Conventions.
B. The History of American Participation in International
Judicial Assistance
The premise that each nation has exclusive rights over its own
territory is an accepted principle of international law that cannot be
seriously rebutted. 27 Thus, international judicial cooperation devel-
oped as a necessary component of the natural ordering of legal rela-
tionships within the civilized global community. Indeed, almost a
century ago, the Oregon Supreme Court observed that the rendition
of judicial assistance:
appertains to the administration of justice in its best sense, and its
exercise is now common and unquestioned among civilized na-
tions. It is true that the duty may not be imposed by positive local
25. Id. at 7.
26. Seidel, supra note 16, at 28.
27. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 20 Com-
ment b (1965).
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law, but it rests on national comity, creating a duty that no state
could refuse to fulfill without forfeiting its standing among the civi-
lized states of the world.
28
As far back as 1855, Congress enacted a statute authorizing federal
courts to assist foreign tribunals.29 The early federal international ju-
dicial assistance legislation was primarily designed to facilitate the
transmission of letters rogatory with certain liberalizations in the leg-
islation occurring in the 1948 amendments.
30
In 1964 Congress comprehensively revised the federal judicial
assistance statutes. That same year the United States joined the
Hague Conference which enabled the United States delegation to par-
ticipate as a full member in the Conference's tenth session in October
of 1964. 3 1
The Hague Conference resulted in the 1965 drafting of the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudi-
cial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters. 32 The United
States became a party to the Convention in 1969. The United States
later became a party to the Hague Evidence Convention which came
into force in 1972. Both the Hague Service and Evidence Conven-
tions represent revisions of Chapters I and II of the 1954 Hague Con-
vention on Civil Procedure which, in turn, was a modification of the
1905 Hague Convention. 33
The United States delegation further participated in negotiating
the Inter-American Convention of Letters Rogatory in 1975. 34 In
that same year they were a party to the negotiation of the Inter-Amer-
ican Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad. 35 In 1979, an addi-
tional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on Letters
Rogatory was negotiated and, in 1980, that Protocol and the Inter-
American Convention on Letters Rogatory were signed by the United
States.36
28. Oregon v. Bourne, 21 Or. 218, 228, 27 P. 1048 (1891).
29. Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630.
30. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 117, 62 Stat. 949; Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63
Stat. 103.
31. B. RISTAU, supra note 14, at 6.
32. 20 U.S.C. 361; T.I.A.S. No. 6638; 658 U.N.T.S. 163, done at the Hague November
15, 1965. [hereinafter Hague Service Convention].
33. Amram, U.S. Ratification of the Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad, 67
AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1973).
34. 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 339 (1975).
35. Id. at 328.
36. 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 312 (1981).
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In December of 1980, the United States acceded to the Hague
Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for foreign pub-
lic documents.37 In addition, the advice and consent of the Senate
was received in 1979 for the Hague Public Documents Convention
which was entered into force and effect for the United States in
1981.38
Consequently, it is evident that the United States became ex-
tremely active in the negotiation and signing of various multilateral
international judicial assistance conventions since 1964. A more de-
tailed history of the formation of the Hague Evidence Convention and
the involvement of the United States in its formation follows.
III. NEGOTIATING HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE CONVENTION
The purpose and intent of the Hague Evidence Convention, as
articulated by Phillip W. Amram, the United States representative to
the special commission and rapporteur of the special commission
which drafted the Evidence Convention, is as follows:
In broad outline, the Convention seeks to:
(1) improve the existing system of Letters of Request;
(2) enlarge the devices for the taking of evidence by increasing
the powers of consuls and by introducing in the civil law world, on
a limited basis, the concept of the commissions; and
(3) preserve all the more favorable and less restrictive practices
arising from internal law, internal rules of procedure, and bilateral
or multilateral conventions.
39
Although the United States was a member of the Hague Conference
on Private International Law in 1964, which produced the Interna-
tional Convention on the Service of Documents Abroad, the United
States was more active in its participation and drafting of the Hague
Evidence Convention. 40
Pre-Convention discovery by United States litigants of foreign
evidence had always been difficult 41 and often times unsuccessful.42
37. 527 U.S.T. 189, opened for signature, October 5, 1961.
38. 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 790 (1981).
39. Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A.J.
651, 652 (1969); Report of U.S. Delegation to Hague Conference, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
785, 805 (1969).
40. See Amram, supra note 39.
41. See, e.g., Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation,
14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747 (1974); and Onkelinx, Conflict of International Jurisdiction: Ordering
the Production of Documents in Violation of the Law Situs, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 487 (1969).
42. See, e.g., Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
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The Convention as explained by Mr. Amram to American lawyers,
was touted as a great step forward in international judicial assistance:
The Convention deserves the warm support of the American Bar
Association and early ratification by the Senate. Like the Docu-
ments Convention, it carries out the Association's long struggle for
improvement in international judicial cooperation. It makes no
major changes in the United States' procedure and requires no ma-
jor changes in the United States' legislation or rules. On the other
front, it will give the United States courts and litigants abroad
enormous aid by providing an international agreement for the tak-
ing of testimony, the absence of which has created barriers to our
courts and litigants.
43
The Convention was intended by the negotiators to be a compromise
in resolution of the conflict arising from the interface of United States
and foreign, particularly civil, legal systems. 44 It was recognized in
the President's letter to the Senate for advice and consent in ratifying
the Convention, that the Hague Evidence Convention was consistent
with the United States' policy for international judicial assistance but
would require many other countries, particularly civil law countries,
to make "important changes in their judicial assistance practice. ' 45
Even though it was recognized that foreign countries would have to
make certain adjustments consistent with the Hague Evidence Con-
vention, the concepts of state sovereignty and internal public policy
were preserved:
The Chairman [of the commission] succinctly stated the basic prin-
ciple which animated all the discussion. Any system of obtaining
evidence or securing the performance of other judicial acts interna-
tionally must be "tolerable" in the state of execution and must also
be "utilizable" in the forum of the state of origin where the action
is pending.
46
Given that liberal judicial assistance to foreign litigants was already
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 78 S.Ct. 1087 (1958); see also Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws,
88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979).
43. See Amram, supra note 39, at 655.
44. Id.; see also letter of transmittal from Richard Nixon on the Convention on the Tak-
ing of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATER-
IALS 323 (1973).
45. Id.
46. Explanatory report on the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or




mandated by federal law, 4 7 it appeared the United States had all to
gain from the Convention and nothing to lose.48  The Convention
attempted to accommodate discovery "American style" to a limited
extent,49 and at the same time preserve civil law judicial sovereignty
and evidence gathering.50 Respect for signatory countries' internal
law and procedures was afforded by preserving the right of a signa-
tory nation to make specific declarations limiting their obligations to
provide judicial assistance. 51 Specifically, a Contracting State may de-
clare under Article 23 of the Convention that it "will not execute Let-
ters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery
of documents as known in common law countries. '5 2 It is this decla-
ration which has caused the most aggravation for United States liti-
gants in their quest for foreign evidence in international litigation.
53
A more detailed analysis of this declaration and of the Convention's
procedures follows.
IV. CONVENTION PROCEDURES
A. Parties to the Convention
The Convention provides that the States which were represented
at the Eleventh Session at the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law are entitled to become parties to the Convention.5 4 After
the Convention has entered into force, any other state may accede to
the Convention if it is a member of the Hague Convention, a member
of the United Nations or one of its agencies, or if it is a party to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.55
It should be noted that a later accession is not automatic and
becomes effective only if other States file a "declaration" accepting the
accession. Consequently, the accession is ineffective as to those states
which file no declaration.
56
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
48. See generally Amram, supra note 39.
49. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 10, at arts. 15, 21.
50. Id. at art. 9.
51. See, e.g., id., at art. 23.
52. Id.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 94-112.
54. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 10, at art. 37.
55. Id. at art. 39(1).
56. Id.
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B. Structure of the Convention
The Convention is divided into three parts or chapters. Chapter
One deals with Letters of Request, regulating their form, content,
methods of transmission, language, method of execution, compulsion,
privileges, grounds for refusal to execute the letter and the question of
costs.
57
Chapter Two involves the use of consuls or court appointed com-
missioners to take evidence. This chapter specifically deals with the
circumstances under which a consul or a commissioner may take evi-
dence. It further explains the approvals necessary in the State of exe-
cution and other procedures concerning the use of consuls or
commissioners including the limits of their power.58
Chapter Three contains the general provisions and clauses of the
Convention. This chapter sets forth the specifics with respect to the
central authority. It further regulates the relationship between the
present Convention and the Civil Procedure Conventions of 1905 and
1954. Reservations, declarations, accessions, dispute resolution, and
denunciations are all covered in that chapter.
It should be emphasized that Chapter Three contains Article 23
which, as explained above, allows contradicting States not to execute
Letters of Request seeking pre-trial discovery of documents. To date,
all States that have ratified the Convention, with the exception of
Czechoslovakia, Israel, and the United States, have issued declara-
tions under Article 23 stating that they will not honor requests "for
the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in
common law countries." 59
C. Scope of the Convention
Article 1 of the Convention provides that judicial assistance is to
be rendered only in "civil or commercial matters." The Convention
does not define civil or commercial. The use of the phrase "civil or
commercial matters" is derived from the 1905 and 1954 Civil Proce-
dure Conventions which employed the same term.60 Previous use of
the phrase made it apparent that a definition would be necessary.
The failure to define the phrase creates an ambiguity for Ameri-
can courts because it is not clear whether administrative proceedings
57. Id. at arts. 1-14.
58. Id. at arts. 15-22.
59. Id. at art. 23.
60. B. RISTAU, supra note 14, at 180.
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would be covered. The leading treatise explains the problems this
way:
In sum, the characterization of a suit in the requesting state as
"civil" or "commercial," or the designation of a court as "civil
court" or "commercial court," does not establish conclusively that
a matter is "civil" or "commercial;" the underlying cause of action
and the nature of the relief sought must be considered in determin-
ing whether a request falls within the scope of the Convention.
Based on this analysis, American practitioners can expect to en-
counter some difficulties abroad, at least in some Convention
states, with Letters of Request issued by the Court of International
Trade, the Tax Court, and the Claims Court.
61
Further limitations on the scope of the Convention can be de-
rived from Article 1 which limits the issuance of a Letter of Request
to "judicial" authorities of the State of origin. Thus, the Hague Evi-
dence Convention is clear that a Letter of Request must originate
from a court or tribunal relating to a controversy in litigation or
before a court.
D. The Central Authority
Pursuant to Article 2, it is incumbent upon each Contracting
State to establish a "Central Authority" for the receipt of Requests
from other Contracting States. 62 The idea of a Central Authority
arose in connection with the Hague Service Convention. The function
of the Central Authority is to receive Requests and transmit them to
an executing authority. In the United States, the Department of Jus-
tice acts as the Central Authority for receiving Letters of Request.
63
Although it is not required, States that have ratified the Hague Ser-
vice Convention and Hague Evidence Convention have designated the
same authority as its Central Authority for both Conventions. The
Hague Evidence Convention further allows designations of other au-
thorities in addition to its Central Authority and federal States are
"free to designate more than one Central Authority." 64 In addition,
provisions are made for Contracting States with more than one legal
system.
65
61. Id. at 183.
62. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 10, at art. 2.
63. 28 C.F.R. § 0.49 (1983).
64. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 10, at art. 24.
65. Id. at art. 25.
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E. Letters of Request
Article 3 of the Convention prescribes the content of a Letter of
Request. Article 4 regulates the appropriate language to be utilized.
Both articles are crucial in that a Central Authority is empowered to
reject a letter for failing to comply with the provisions of the
Convention. 6
6
Article 3 is specific as to what items of information are required
to be contained in the Letter of Request. For example, the authority
requesting execution and the authority requested to execute it are to
be included. Further, the nature of the proceedings and the evidence
to be obtained relating to the scope of the Convention are required.6
7
In addition, if live testimony of witnesses is required, then specific
additional information must also be given. 68
At the meeting of the special commission at the Hague in June of
1978, the need for a model form for use in the transmission of interna-
tional Letters of Request was pointed out.69 A drafting committee
was appointed and a recommended form was developed. Delegates of
the Contracting States took it upon themselves to publicize the rec-
ommended form in their respective countries.70
Since the Hague Evidence Convention is multilateral, the prob-
lem of language translation arises. Article 4 lays down the basic gen-
eral rule that every Letter of Request must be written in the language
of the State of execution or be accompanied by a translation into that
language. That same Article creates a general exception requiring ac-
ceptance of a Letter either in English or French or a translation into
one of these respective languages unless a contracting party had filed a
reservation as authorized by Article 33. 71
Nine Contracting States do not have French or English as an
official language. Of those countries, Czechoslovakia, Israel, and
Sweden have declared that they will accept Requests in English or
French. 72 Denmark, Finland, and Norway have declared that they
will accept Requests in English. 73 The United States has declared
66. Id. at art. 5.
67. Id. at art. 1.
68. Id. at art. 3.
69. B. RISTAU, supra note 14, at 194.
70. Id. at 195.
71. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4.




that it will accept Letters of Request in French. 74 Article 4 further
requires that in the event that an incorrect language is used in a Letter
without justifiable excuse, the costs of such translation into the re-
quired language shall be borne by the State of origin. 75
Article 9 provides that the execution of a Letter of Request shall
be pursuant to the "methods and procedures" of the executing au-
thority. This Article further provides that a special method or proce-
dure may be requested by the requesting authority which is to be
followed unless such procedure would be "incompatible with the in-
ternal law of the State of execution" or impossible or impracticable. 76
The general rule followed in the Convention is that costs in-
curred for or in the execution of Letters of Request "shall not give rise
to any reimbursement." Articles 14 and 26 regulate the costs and
fees for special procedures and service of process. 7 7 Article 28(f) does
permit bilateral agreements concerning arrangements between Con-
tracting States on such issues. 78
F Declarations Under Article 23 of the Hague
Evidence Convention
Article 23 of the Convention permits a State to declare that it
will not execute a Letter of Request issued "for the purpose of ob-
taining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law
countries. ' 79 All Contracting States to the Convention, with the ex-
ception of Czechoslovakia, Israel, and the United States, have made
declarations under Article 23, essentially declining to execute Letters
of Request seeking pre-trial discovery of documents.8 0
It should be emphasized that Article 23 restricts declarations to
"obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents."8 1 Consequently, a Con-
tracting State may not decline to execute a Letter of Request seeking
testimony of witnesses on the ground that such request constitutes
pre-trial discovery of evidence. Regardless of the wording of Article
23 and the declarations, the existence of Article 23, together with the
civil law mentality, mandates that the American lawyer patiently ex-
74. Id.
75. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4.
76. Id. at art. 9.
77. Id. at arts. 14, 26.
78. Id. at art. 28(f).
79. Id. at art. 23.
80. B. RISTAU, supra note 14, at app. C.
81. Id. at 233.
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plain to the executing authorities the American litigation process.
The necessity of this educational process is emphasized by Bruno Ris-
tau in his treatise:
What lawyers and authorities in civil law jurisdictions find difficult
to accept is: first, that American procedural law obligates the par-
ties and their lawyers to gather all relevant and material evidence
prior to the actual trial of the cause; second, that it is not the func-
tion of American judges to participate directly in the evidence-
gathering process; and third, that (except for proceedings in some
specialized courts, such as the Claims Court, the Court of Interna-
tional Trade, or the Tax Court) civil suits in this country are not
tried "in installments." Lawyers trained only in continental proce-
dural law find it difficult to accept that litigating parties in this
country must have all the evidence on which they intend to rely on
hand at the start of trial and that-especially where the case is
tried before a jury-an American court will not order the trial
stopped or suspended to enable a party to search for additional
evidence abroad. Yet, some continental writers and courts contend
that only a request issued after the actual trial has started shows
conclusively that the evidence sought is intended for use at trial;
requests for evidence at any earlier stage of the proceeding will
always be suspected as constituting an impermissible "fishing expe-
dition," designed to search out evidence on the basis of which to
build a case.
8 2
Ristau goes on to suggest that for an American attorney to be
successful in Letters of Request, it is incumbent upon him to identify
the issues in some formal proceeding in order to substantiate to the
foreign party or court that the evidence he is seeking pertains to such
issues.8 3 In the alternative, a party could have the trial court make a
finding in the Letter of Request that the evidence sought is "for use at
trial."#8
G. Taking of Evidence by Diplomatic Officers, Consular Agents,
and Commissioners
Chapter Two of the Convention provides for the taking of evi-
dence by "diplomatic officers and consular agents and court ap-
pointed commissioners. '85 For the purposes of this discussion,
82. Id. at 233-34.
83. Id. at 235.
84. Id.
85. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 10, at ch. II.
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diplomatic officers and consular agents will be referred to as consuls.
Article 15 specifies the circumstances under which the consuls can
take evidence:
In civil or commercial matters, a diplomatic officer or consular
agent of a Contracting State may, in the territory of another Con-
tracting State and within the area where he exercises his functions,
take evidence without compulsion of nationals of the State which
he represents in aid of proceedings commenced in the courts of a
State which he represents.
86
Although Article 15 limits the powers of the consul to take evidence
from his own nationals, Article 16 extends his powers to take evi-
dence from nationals of the host State. The underlying condition
under both Articles 15 and 16 is that such testimony or evidence can-
not be obtained under compulsion.87 In the case of Article 16, appro-
priate permission must be obtained generally or specifically from the
host State.88
Article 17 authorizes a person duly appointed as a commissioner
to take evidence in the territory of the Contracting State "in aid of
proceedings commenced in the courts of another Contracting
State."8 9 Permission is also required in the State where the evidence
is to be taken; consequently, evidence can be taken from all types of
witnesses, domestic or foreign, to the State of execution. Article 17
provides that the requirement of permission may be waived by decla-
ration. To date, only Finland and the United States have given un-
restricted permission to court appointed commissioners to take
evidence in their States. The United Kingdom has granted such per-
mission on the condition of reciprocity, and Denmark and Portugal
have filed declarations that they will not permit commissioners to take
testimony in their States. All other States would require permission
pursuant to Article 17. 90
Finally, Article 18 of the Convention allows a Contracting State
to declare that a consul or commissioner may seek compulsory assist-
ance against the witness from the host State. If a State chooses to file
such a declaration, upon granting of an appropriate application to a
designated authority, compulsory measures against the witness can be
applied "which are appropriate and are prescribed by its law for use
86. Id. at art. 15.
87. Id. at arts. 15-16.
88. Id. at art. 16.
89. Id. at art. 17.
90. Id.
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in internal proceedings." 91 To date, only the United States has filed
an unqualified declaration making available to foreign counsels un-
qualified court compulsion. 92 Czechoslovakia and the United King-
dom have declared that compulsory measures will be applied only on
the basis of reciprocity.
93
This concludes a brief analysis of the substantive provisions and
detailed procedures provided for in the Convention. Even with the
availability of such detailed procedures, which are reputed to be an
improvement in international judicial assistance to United States liti-
gants, there remains dissatisfaction on both sides of the Atlantic con-
cerning the application and use of the Convention by United States
litigants seeking the discovery of evidence abroad.
V. CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE UTILIZATION OF THE
CONVENTION BY UNITED STATES LITIGANTS
The United States litigants were dissatisfied with the numerous
declarations filed by Contracting Parties and the declarations con-
cerning Article 23 which allows parties to refuse to honor Requests to
obtain pre-trial discovery of documents.94 This dissatisfaction with
Article 23 and other problems associated with the operation of the
Convention resulted in a meeting of the Special Commission in June
1978. 95 The United States delegate to the Commission, Mr. Bruno
Ristau, attempted to deal with the declarations of Contracting Parties
under Article 23 of the Convention. 96 What surfaced, for presumably
the first time, was the gross misunderstanding expressed by other
members of the Commission concerning their translation of "pre-trial
discovery:"
It became apparent to this commentator, who served as the United
States delegate to the Commission, that there was not only consid-
91. Id. at art. 18.
92. 28 U.S.C. 1782(A); B. RISTAU, supra note 14, at 262.
93. B. RISTAU, supra note 14, at app. C.
94. See id. for declarations of contracting parties: France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom, all of which have made
declarations under Article 23.
95. Report on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague Con-
vention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, reprinted in 17
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1417, 1425 (1978) [hereinafter Special Commission]; see also Report
on the Second Meeting of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, reprinted in 24 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1668 (1985).
96. Special Commission, supra note 95, at 1421.
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erable apprehension about the sweeping pre-trial discovery practice
permitted under United States law, but that the delegates from a
number of civil law countries displayed an appalling misunder-
standing of the institution of "pre-trial discovery." To them, the
term "pre-trial" was synonymous with "prior to the institution of
the suit." Almost all civil law delegates were conversant with the
English expression "fishing expedition." It therefore followed that
their States had to decline lending judicial aid to such searches for
potential evidence by prospective plaintiffs.
97
This misunderstanding of an essential term, coupled with the
Contracting Parties' general hostility to United States discovery
methods98 and American notions of in personam jurisdiction, 99 has
exacerbated the problem of United States litigants actually using the
Hague Evidence Convention. °°
Although these problems appear to persist,' 0 ' they have not
proven insurmountable for United States parties seeking foreign dis-
covery. The House of Lords in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. ,102 required the execution of Letters of Request for docu-
ments even in the face of the United Kingdom's declaration under
Article 23.103
A recent German decision also liberalized the scope of discovery
under the Hague Evidence Convention when the Court finally real-
ized the meaning of "pre-trial discovery:"
Finally, petitioners contend[ed] that the request should not have
been approved because it was issued at the "pre-trial discovery"
stage of the proceeding and, therefore, the evidence was "not in-
tended for use in judicial proceeding commenced or contem-
plated," as required by Paragraph 2, Article 1, of the Convention.
The decision of this panel of 31 October 1980 (9 VA 3/80) estab-
lishes, and the legal literature there cited teaches, that the "pre-
trial discovery" stage not only presuppose[d] a pending judicial
proceeding before an American Court, but that it is an essential
97. B. RISTAU, supra note 14, at 229.
98. See generally Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 9.
99. See generally Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Ob-
taining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 733, 758-765 (1983).
100. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 2 W.L.R. 81, 1 All E.R. 434
(1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 38 (1977).
101. See infra notes 119-36 and accompanying text.
102. Id.
103. B. RISTAU, supra note 14, at 250.
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part of the securing of evidence to be introduced at "trial."'' 0 4
Furthermore, under Germany's Article 23, declaration prohibit-
ing the pre-trial discovery of documents, the German court expressly
permitted testimony as to such documents which the United States
litigants had sought:
Nor in the opinion of this panel does such a holding amount
to a disregard of the [German] declaration under Article 23 of the
Convention. German law permits the examination of third persons
as witnesses concerning the contents of documents, which docu-
ments themselves need not be surrendered or produced.105
Given the reasoning of the above decisions, which represent civil
law as well as common law Contracting Parties, such decisions will
certainly have an impact on the further liberalization of the execution
of United States Requests abroad. 0 6 Indeed, the Scandinavian coun-
tries have recently narrowed their Article 23 declaration's scope sub-
stantially. The following quotation from the Finland declaration
illustrates this point:
Additional Declaration of December 11, 1980
The declaration made by the Republic of Finland in accordance
with Article 23 concerning "Letters of Request issued for the pur-
pose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents" shall apply
only to Letters of Request which require a person:
(A) To state what documents relevant to the proceedings to
which the Letter of Request relates are, or have been, in his posses-
sion, custody or power; or
(B) To produce any documents other than particular docu-
ments specified in the Letter of Request, which are likely to be in
104. Appeal of Siemans/Siecor and the Individual Corporate Officers (Opinion and Judg-
ment of November 27, 1980, Docket No. 9 VA 4/80) reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1025, 1039 (1980).
105. Id. at 1037-38.
106. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 679, 692 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Section 3, Article 31 speaks to
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, which provides as follows:
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(A) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpreta-
tion of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(B) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;




his possession, custody or power.10 7
It is unfortunate that, during a period of increased awareness of
the Convention both here and abroad, together with the apparent lib-
eralization in its use by Contracting Parties, 08utilization of the Con-
vention in the United States should be met with opposition by both
United States litigants and courts. 0 9 A review of the negotiating his-
tory" 0 indicates that the Convention is an improvement, and foreign
judicial treatment indicates the desire to accommodate United States
forms of discovery.' 1 ' Indeed, it should be emphasized that Article 23
only includes the discovery of documents in the possible declarations
and not pre-trial discovery of testimony which is permitted."
2
What follows is an analysis of the judicial treatment of the Hague
Evidence Convention by American courts. Although the case author-
ity interpreting the Convention and applying it has not yet fully devel-
oped, trends are starting to appear in holdings that, in this author's
opinion, are contrary to the intention of the drafters and the under-
standing of other Contracting Parties.
VI. THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE
HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION BY THE UNITED
STATES COURTS
A. Introductory Statement
At the outset of this discussion, it is important to note that the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
In re Anschuetz and Co.," I 3 has had by far the greatest impact of any
decision on state and federal courts in their treatment of the Hague
Evidence Convention. That decision, which will be discussed in detail
below, had such a major effect on state and federal courts that the
discussion which follows will analyze cases in the pre- and post-An-
schuetz eras of the judicial treatment of the Hague Evidence
Convention.
107. B. RISTAU, supra note 14, at app. C. Additional Scandinavian countries that modi-
fied Article 23 Declarations are Norway and Sweden.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co. GMBH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
110. See Amram, supra note 39.
111. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
112. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 10, at art. 23; B. RIsTAU, supra note 14, at
§ 5-36.
113. 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
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B. State Courts
Although some commentators have pointed out that certain un-
reported state court decisions have decreed the exclusive application
of the Hague Evidence Convention in all cases involving foreign evi-
dence gathering,"14 a search of reported decisions discloses no such
similar holdings. The four state cases that have addressed the issue
prior to the Anschuetz decision have uniformly held that the principle
of international comity and other considerations compel resorting first
to the provisions of the Hague Evidence Convention prior to the utili-
zation of state Rules of Civil Procedure.1 1 5 Two state court decisions
have been reported subsequent to the Anschuetz decision. The earlier
of the two followed the majority of state courts in holding that comity
considerations mandate the resort to the Convention in the first in-
stance.1 1 6 The more recent New York decision held that the Conven-
tion is not applicable when evidence is sought from a foreign party
subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the court." 7 The latter deci-
sion expressly followed the holding of the Anschuetz panel, borrowing
from that court the jurisdiction-based analysis governing the applica-
tion of the Convention." 8
C. Federal Court Decisions
1. Federal District Court Decisions
Federal court decisions prior to the Anschuetz case were almost
evenly divided between those courts instructing that resort to the
Convention should be in the interest of comity in the first instance,'9
and other decisions holding that resort to the Convention was discre-
tionary. 120 The latter line of cases justified their holdings on a juris-
diction-based analysis that was later adopted by the Anschuetz
114. See Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters. The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 1461, 1473 n.61 (1984); B. RISTAU, supra note 14, § 5-40 at 256.1.
115. Pierburg, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 238; Volkswagenwerk, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 840; Vincent
v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, 193 N.J. Super. 716, 721-24, 475 A.2d 686, 689-91 (1984); Gold-
schmidt v. Smith, 676 S.W. 2d 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
116. Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinefabrik v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492, 504-05 (W. Va. 1985).
117. Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1985).
118. Id. at 577.
119. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 48-49
(D.D.C. 1984); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 60
(E.D.Pa. 1983); and Compagnie Francaise D'Assurance Pour Le Commerce Exterieur v. Phil-
lips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).




United States District Court decisions subsequent to the An-
schuetz decision have uniformly followed its lead. 122 First, in Work v.
Bier,123 a magistrate in the District of Columbia Circuit held that an
order directing the deposition in the United States of a foreign na-
tional who lived abroad was not subject to the Hague Evidence Con-
vention. Secondly, the most recent decision from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee held that docu-
ments ordered to be produced from a party defendant are not subject
to the procedures of the Convention even if the documents are located
abroad.
24
2. United States Court of Appeals Decisions
To date, the leading United States Court of Appeals decision an-
alyzing in detail the necessity of resorting to the Hague Evidence
Convention procedures is the case of In re Anschuetz. 125 In that case
the appellate panel was asked to overturn a ruling of a United States
magistrate ordering depositions in Germany of some of Anschuetz'
employees. 26 The Court of Appeals denied mandamus, thus essen-
tially affirming the magistrate's order in the face of Anschuetz' and
the German government's contention that the discovery order would
be a "violation of German sovereignty unless the order is transmitted
according to a Letter of Request as specified in the Hague Conven-
tion." 27 The Anschuetz panel incorporated into its reasoning the ju-
risdiction-based analysis of recent federal court decisions which chose
not to apply the Convention:
We agree with the court's conclusion in Graco that "the Conven-
tion was [not] intended to protect foreign parties, over whom an
American court properly has jurisdiction, from the normal range
of pre-trial discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil
Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Intern. Soc. for Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
121. Graco v. Kremlin Inc., 101 F.R.D. at 519-21.
122. Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 1985); Lowrance v. Weinig, 107 F.R.D. 386
(W.D. Tenn. 1985).
123. 106 F.R.D. at 45.
124. Lowrance, 107 F.R.D. at 388-89.
125. 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
126. Id. at 605.
127. Id.; The court's decision also recognized the Department of Justice amicus brief
which took the position that a court order to conduct depositions on foreign soil would violate
the international law obligations of the United States. Id.
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Procedure." We find particularly apt the court's observation that
the Convention does not require deference to a foreign country's
judicial sovereignty over documents, people, and information-if
this is really how civil law judicial sovereignty is understood-
when such documents are to be produced in the United States. As
Graco held, "Discovery does not, take place within [a state's] bor-
ders, merely because documents to be produced somewhere else
are located. Similarly, discovery should be considered as taking
place here, not in another country, when interrogatories are served
here, even if the necessary information is located in the other
country." 1
28
Although the Anschuetz court did note that the exercise of a
court's power "should be tempered by a healthy respect for the princi-
ples of comity,"'1 29 it left such comity analysis for the lower courts. A
reading of the decision exhibits such a "pro American" discovery bias
that any lower court comity analysis would be distorted in favor of
the United States litigant's paramount interest of full discovery:1
30
Anschuetz' interpretation of the treaty, taken to its logical conclu-
sion, would give foreign litigants an extraordinary advantage in
United States courts. Insofar as Anschuetz seeks discovery it
would be permitted the full range of free discovery provided by the
federal rules. But when a United States adversary sought discov-
ery, this discovery would be limited to the cumbersome procedures
and narrow range authorized by the Convention. Further, we be-
lieve that requiring domestic litigants to resort to the Hague Con-
vention to compel discovery against their foreign adversaries
encourages the concealment of information-a result directly anti-
thetical to the express goals of the federal rules and the Hague
Convention which aim to encourage the flow of information among
adversaries. '
3
It is interesting to note that two other decisions out of the Fifth
Circuit 132 have mentioned the Hague Evidence Convention subse-
quent to the Anschuetz decision. Only one of those decisions involved
the application of the Convention.1 3 3 Subsequent decisions from the
128. Id. at 611.
129. Id. at 614.
130. Id. at 610.
131. Id. at 606.
132. In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GMBH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), petition
for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3084 (1985); Tenneco Resins Inc. v. Davy Intern., AG, 770 F.2d
416 (5th Cir. 1985).
133. See In re Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d at 729.
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Eighth and Ninth Circuits have followed the Anschuetz reasoning. 34
Other appellate circuits, including the noted international forums of
New York and Washington, D.C., have not had the opportunity to
rule on the application of the Hague Evidence Convention, although
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in dictum,
has suggested that the Convention procedures are the only available
means of obtaining certain evidence. 135 It is also reasonable to assume
that the District of Columbia Circuit will be asked to review this
question in the very near future.
13 6
3. United States Supreme Court Decisions
Although the United States Supreme Court has previously cho-
sen to stay on the sidelines concerning the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion controversy,1 37 the Court has recently granted certiorari to
consider the matter.1 38 Pre-Hague Evidence Convention decisions
from the United States Supreme Court are worth analyzing as an indi-
cation of the Court's possible contemporary approach to the interpre-
tation of the Convention. In the case of Societe Internationale v.
Rogers,139 the United States Supreme Court exhibited a profound sen-
sitivity and respect for the sovereignty of Switzerland in refusing to
sanction the plaintiff's inability to produce documents due to foreign
law:
In view of the findings in this case, the position in which petitioner
stands in the litigation, and the serious constitutional questions we
have noted, we think that Rule 37 should not be construed to au-
thorize dismissal of this complaint because of petitioner's noncom-
pliance with a pre-trial production order when it has been
established that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not
willfulness, bad-faith, or any fault of petitioner. 140
134. In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, - U.S. -, 90 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1986) (No. 85-1695, 1985 Term). Amicus briefs have
been filed by the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Italy, and
France urging reversal of the Anschuetz line of cases. National Industrial v. Superior Ct., 788
F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Boreri v. Fiat S.P.A., 763 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1985).
135. Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
136. See, e.g., Work, 106 F.R.D. at 56-57; Notice can be taken that the District of Colum-
bia is one of the world centers for international litigation and arbitration.
137. 83 L. Ed.2d 223.
138. See supra note 134. A petition for certiorari has also been filed in Anschuetz, and in
In re Messerschmitt Bolkow, 754 F.2d at 602.
139. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
140. Id. at 212. The Supreme Court's decision recognized that the petitioner was an
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Furthermore, dicta from past United States Supreme Court deci-
sions favor the application of the Hague Evidence Convention and its
procedures if such rules conflict with national law.141 More recently,
the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that the U.S. judiciaries defer-
ence to U.S. law and courts must be balanced against the overriding
interest of U.S. involvement in international economic relations:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solem contracts, we insist on a
parochical concept that all disputes must be resolved under our
laws and in our courts. Absent a contract forum, the considera-
tions relied on by the court of appeals would be persuasive reasons
for holding an American forum convenient in the traditional sense,
but in an era of expanding world trade and commerce, the absolute
aspects of the doctrine of the Carbon-Black case have little place
and would be a heavy hand indeed on the future development of
international commercial dealing by Americans. We cannot have
trade and commerce in world markets and international waters ex-
clusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
courts. 
142
D. Summary and Analysis
To summarize the current judicial treatment of the Hague Evi-
dence Convention, courts have chosen to follow the Anschuetz reason-
ing with regard to depositions and the production of documents from
foreign nationals or foreign parties subject to the in personam jurisdic-
tion of the forum court. Concerning depositions, the court merely
orders the foreign party, usually a corporation, to provide its employ-
ees or officers for deposition in the United States. 143 It then allows the
deposition to be taken in the foreign country if it would be more con-
venient for the deponent. 1, With regard to the production of docu-
ments, the court merely holds that a document request served in this
country is outside the Convention since such a request involves evi-
American plaintiff subject to criminal sanctions in Switzerland because the production of such
documents pursuant to court order would violate Swiss laws. Id. at 211.
141. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (the court noted, "[t]his
doctrine of construction is in accord with the long-heeded admonition of Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall that 'an act of congress (sic) ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations
if any other possible construction remains'."). Id.
142. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (emphasis added).




dence obtained in this country and not abroad. 145
Other judicial justifications for avoiding the Convention involve
an analysis of the negotiating history in support of the argument that
the Convention did not effectively repeal the Federal Rules in foreign
evidence situations.' 46 Another avoidance justification centers on the
purpose of the Convention to improve the situation and not frustrate
it. 147 The latter assumes that discovery was much broader prior to
the Convention. 48 Other courts have cited the practical difficulties
associated with the procedures 149 and the time and cost involved to
justify disregarding the Convention. 50 Still other courts have looked
to the declarations of the other Contracting Parties under Article 23
of the Convention in refusing to comply with requests for pre-trial
discovery of documents as a justification for avoiding the Convention
on the basis of futility. Indeed, courts have even resorted to pulling
words and phrases out of the Hague Evidence Convention to support
the argument that it was not intended to be exclusive. This has been
done in a comparative analysis with the Hague Service Convention,
which the courts contend was intended to be exclusive.151
Clearly, the above summary and analysis raises many interesting
questions of international law and procedure which have only re-
cently been addressed by various commentators in the field. Since the
judicial treatment of the Hague Evidence Convention is literally
changing by the day, it is difficult for commentators to provide the
courts with current articles. The most recent articles on the subject
are surely to impact the continued treatment of the Hague Evidence
Convention and consequently their analysis follows.
VII. THE COMMENTATORS AND THE HAGUE
EVIDENCE CONVENTION
Until recently, most articles on the Hague Evidence Convention
were primarily explanatory with regard to the procedures as opposed
145. Lowrance v. Weinig, 107 F.R.D. 386, 389 (W.D. Tenn. 1985).
146. Compagnie Francaise D'Assorance Pour Le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
147. Laker Airways Ltd., 103 F.R.D. at 49.
148. See contra WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Civil § 2083.
149. Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 778-90 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Fabrik,
101 F.R.D. 360, 361 (1984).
150. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 48 (D.C. Dist.
1984).
151. Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492, 500-01 (W. Va. 1985).
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to an analysis of its interpretation and application. 52 Current articles
and texts are either critical of American extraterritorial discovery in
general' 53 or critical of attempts by the judiciary to avoid the Conven-
tion in particular. 154 Since the American bar and judiciary appear to
be understandably ignorant of foreign law and procedures, 155 law re-
view articles and commentaries play an important role in interna-
tional litigation.
A. Domestic Commentators
United States commentators have recently instructed that while
our courts view extraterritorial discovery as proper, other countries
view it as a violation of international law.' 56 Indeed, Professor
Oxman, the commentator most frequently cited by the courts on
either side of the issue, describes the apparent detachment of Ameri-
can courts concerning in personam jurisdiction and the assertion of
the right to extraterritorial discovery:
The circumstances in which in personam jurisdiction becomes con-
founded with the power to compel discovery are all too familiar.
Committed to the value of the convenience of the plaintiff (particu-
larly in tort actions) not to mention that of the local bar, courts
assert in personam jurisdiction on the basis of "minimum con-
tacts," regardless of whether the defendant is from Rome, Italy, or
from Rome, Georgia. The court then orders depositions of the de-
fendants' employees in Geneva, Switzerland as if they were in Ge-
neva, New York, and the inspection or production of documents or
equipment located in Hanover, West Germany as if they were in
Hanover, New Hampshire. The court normally faces the implica-
tions of what it is doing only when it comes up against a foreign
criminal statute, and even then asserts the power to override for-
eign laws by ordering parties "before the courts" to attempt in
good faith to persuade foreign governments not to enforce their
152. See, e.g., Bishop, International Litigation in Texas: Obtaining Evidence in Foreign
Countries, 19 Hous. L. REv. 361 (1982).
153. See, e.g., Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 9; Von Mehran, Discovery Abroad:
The Perspective of the US. Private Practitioner, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 985 (1984); B.
RISTAU, supra note 14, at 256.1.
154. Radvan, The Hague Evidence Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad In Civil or
Commercial Matters: Notes, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1031 (1984); Mahler & Esser, US.
Discovery Orders and the Hague Evidence Convention: The Controversy Continues, 12-13 [un-
published manuscript written by German lawyers].
155. Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 611.
156. Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 9, at 1089.
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laws that interfere with United States discovery practices.157
Oxman concludes that resort to the Hague Evidence Convention
and other internationally agreed procedures is the preferable alterna-
tive to confrontational discovery, because the latter threatens to fur-
ther impinge on international relations and possibly result in a breach
of the Convention in general.158
Indeed, even the tentative draft of the Revised Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law, which meticulously tries to maintain a neu-
tral position even to the extent of instructing that the Hague Service
Convention may not be mandatory,' 59 instructs that alternative means
of obtaining evidence should be considered prior to resorting to the
type of confrontational discovery methods which have recently been
ordered. 160
The greatest volume of current commentaries on the Hague Evi-
dence Convention and the topic of international discovery in general
can be derived from a 1983 symposium that was held at New York
University Law School. 16 1 At that symposium, many commentators
were vehement in their condemnation of United States extraterritorial
discovery in general, especially when alternative means were
available:
We start with the brute fact that United States extraterritorial dis-
covery is viewed by most foreign international law experts as a vio-
lation of international law. Applying a principle of reasonableness
157. Oxman, supra note 99, at 741-42.
158. Id. at 736.
159. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, introductory note to § 471 at 388.
160. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 437(1)(c)
(Rev. Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986). The pertinent proposed restatement section provides as
follows:
§ 437[420]. Requests for disclosure and foreign government compulsion: Law of the
United States (1)(a) where authorized by statute or rule of court, a court in the
United States may order a person subject to its jurisdiction to produce documents,
objects, or other information directly relevant, necessary, and material to an action
or an investigation, even if the information or the person in possession of the infor-
mation is outside the United States.
(c) In issuing an order directing production of information located abroad, a court
in the United States should take into account the importance to the investigation or
litigation of the documents or other information requested; the degree of specificity
of the request; whether the information originated in the United States; the extent to
which compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state
where the information is located; and the possibility of alternative means of securing
the information . .. (emphasis added).
161. 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. (1984).
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to that fact should, at least, lead to the following inquiry before
foreign discovery is authorized:
(1) Have substantial, good faith efforts to obtain information
within the territory of the United States been undertaken and
found wanting?
(2) What is the likelihood that information exists abroad that can
be expected to be important evidence in an investigation or litiga-
tion, justified by some probative information already obtained?
(3) Can it be shown that jurisdiction is likely to be established
over the one with whom the information is sought and over the
subject matter or the investigation or litigation?
(4) Are there any reasonable alternative means of securing the
foreign information available, such as a bilateral agreement or issu-
ance of Letters of Rogatory, which will not be viewed by foreign
governments as a breach of their sovereignty and a violation of
international law?
162
By far the most detailed analysis of the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion and its procedures is found in the treatise on international judi-
cial assistance prepared by Bruno Ristau. 163 He takes the position
that the exclusivity of the application of the Convention is controlled
by the declarations filed by the Contracting Parties. 164 A reading of
these declarations together with a country's policy, legislative and ju-
dicial pronouncements, is clearly indicative of a country's position.
165
As a consequence, it would be Ristau's position that the current judi-
cial and commentators' analyses miss the mark. But Mr. Ristau has
no problem in taking the position that the Convention was to have a
binding effect on American litigants, impliedly amending or repealing
certain former procedural rights inherent in domestic litigations.1
66
162. Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 9, at 1089-90.
163. B. RISTAU, supra note 14.
164. Id. at 255.
165. Id. at App. C.
166. Id. at 254-55. Mr. Ristau is clear in the mandatory nature of the Evidence
Convention:
Where a state signifies that testimony can be secured in its territory for use in foreign
proceedings only pursuant to the Evidence Convention, United States courts are
bound by that declaration as a matter of federal treaty obligation, and the Conven-
tion is therefore "mandatory" with respect to testimony sought by American litigants
in the territory of such state. With respect to the taking of evidence in the territory of
such state, United States federal and procedural laws-as the laws of the requesting
state-have obviously been affected by these stipulations of the Convention.
Id. at 255. In a note following the above quoted provision, Mr. Ristau further comments as
follows:
It is as if Rule 28 (b), F.R. Civ. P., had been amended by adding a proviso at the end




Foreign commentators, like their American counterparts, appear
to be uniformly critical of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
over foreign parties for the purposes of litigation and discovery. In-
deed, the countries which we find ourselves in acute disagreement
with concerning questions of international jurisdiction and discovery
happen to be our allies and closest trading partners, such as, the
United Kingdom and Germany. Although foreign commentaries in
English concerning American extraterritorial discovery appear to be
somewhat scarce, the few that are available are consistently critical of
United States notions of jurisdiction and the tendency of our courts to
disregard the Hague Evidence Convention. Concerning extraterrito-
rial in personam jurisdiction, a commentator from the United King-
dom makes this observation:
This disagreement is now of increasing worry to us. I am bound to
tell you, in a voice of friendliness, and not hostility, that we are
disturbed for you, for us, and for international trade. We are dis-
turbed that agencies of the United States government, over an ever
widening field of international commerce, are persistently making
more and more attempts to impose domestic laws on persons and
corporations who are not U.S. nationals and who are acting
outside the territory of the U.S. I do not think it is an unfair ques-
tion to ask how you would respond if other nations attempted to
do the same to you. Without putting it tritely, the U.S. was
founded by those who took exception to little matters of taxation
being imposed extraterritorially. 1
67
Foreign commentators on transnational litigation in general ap-
pear to accept as a given that they control, as an incident to their
sovereignty, the taking of evidence in their territory. 16 8 One Japanese
commentator recently emphasized that judicial assistance provided by
the Japanese courts to foreign courts is extremely conditional and
contingent upon reciprocity. In addition to the guarantee of reciproc-
territory of a state that is a member of the Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters except in conformity with the provisions of
the Convention and the declaration of the state of execution."
Id.
167. Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Laws: A Cause for Concern
Amongst Friends of America, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 773 (1979); Heck, Symposium Trans-
national Litigation Part 11 Prospectus from the U.S. and Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 793 (1984).
168. Koroyasu, Symposium Transnational Litigation Part II: Perspectives from the U.S.
and Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 785, 787 (1984); Frei, Symposium Transnational Litigation Part
1: Perspective from the US. and Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 789 (1984).
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ity, Japanese courts require that requests go through diplomatic chan-
nels, that there be a reimbursement of expenses, and appropriate
translations provided. 169 Frei, a Swiss commentator, instructs that
assistance given foreign courts in Switzerland is based on comity and
reciprocity. Frei also emphasizes that Switzerland will, in all
probability, soon sign both the Hague Evidence Convention and the
Hague Service Convention.170 He makes it clear that in Switzerland,
in the absence of such Conventions, Swiss law controls the processing
of requests for evidence which as in Japan, must be processed through
diplomatic channels.
Turning to the commentators on the use of the Hague Evidence
Convention, a German lawyer recently observed that the Convention
"constitutes a remarkable concession by civil law countries, such as
Germany, to the desire of the United States to have U.S. style discov-
ery executed and enforced abroad."1 71 Thus, it is not surprising that
civil law lawyers are understandably confused and surprised at the
difficulty United States courts have in interpreting the Hague Evi-
dence Convention to be mandatory, taking precedence over our do-
mestic rules of civil procedure, both state and federal. That same
German commentator emphasizes that Germany has no problem in
finding that the Hague Evidence Convention is preemptive of local
law:
In contrast to the rather confusing situation in the United States,
there is no question that, under German treaty law the Hague Evi-
dence Convention takes precedence over any conflicting rules of
German civil procedure ....
The majority of the (lower) courts in the United States that to date
had an opportunity to address the issue of the Hague Evidence
Convention, however, have taken the position that the Convention
is not preemptive, but rather only the primary vehicle that must be
used when discovery is to be had abroad; thus, American law on
the subject of discovery abroad is left fully intact ....
Another confusing element that can be found in these cases is that
although they acknowledge the treaty status of the Convention,
they still apply principles of comity. In a treaty context, however,
there is no need to resort to such principles; they have been ab-
169. Koroyasu, supra note 168, at 787.
170. Frei, supra note 168, at 792.
171. Heck, supra note 167, at 795.
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sorbed by the treaty, which constitutes a binding contract between
and among sovereign nations.
Finally, it is interesting to note that as regards the Hague
Convention on Service of Process abroad, which has a treaty struc-
ture that, mutatis mutandis, is identical with that of the Evidence
Convention, there is a plethora of American cases that unequivo-
cally acknowledge its treaty and therefore, preemptive status. The
fact that the Hague Evidence Convention, in effect, might limit the
power American courts might otherwise have, particularly when
they have personal jurisdiction, surely does not justify breaching a
treaty and thereby violating the supremacy clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 17
2
Consequently, the above quote and foreign commentators in gen-
eral raise many interesting questions concerning the law of treaties,
international law, comity, international jurisdiction, and the judicial
treatment of the Hague Service Convention by American courts. A
detailed treatment of these and other issues follows, but first a com-
parative analysis between the Hague Evidence and Service
Conventions.
VIII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: THE HAGUE
SERVICE CONVENTION
The Hague Service Convention was developed at the Tenth Ses-
sion of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in Octo-
ber of 1964. The Service Convention like its counterpart, the
Evidence Convention, was designed to revise and modernize Chapter
One of the Hague Conventions on Civil Procedure of 1905 and
1954.173
The Service Convention was designed to perform three broad
functions:
(A) To establish a system that, to the extent possible, brings ac-
tual notice of the document to be served to the recipient in suffi-
cient time to enable him to defend himself;
(B) To simplify that method of service of judicial documents is-
sued by the courts of the state of origin in the state of execution;
and
(C) To facilitate proof that service has been affected abroad.174
172. Id. at 796-97.
173. B. RISTAU, supra note 14, at 118.
174. Id. at 118-19.
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Like the Evidence Convention, the Service Convention requires
the establishment of a "Central Authority" for the receipt of requests
from other Contracting States. The Central Authority must perform
the functions required in receiving documents and it may perform the
functions of sending documents. The Service Convention does not
require that service abroad be channeled through the Central
Authority. 
75
Aside from the substantive aspects of the Service Convention
dealing with the service of documents, the Convention itself is organ-
ized similarly to the Evidence Convention. The Service Convention
deals with language requirements, methods of transmittal through
diplomatic channels, and costs. 176 Like the Evidence Convention pro-
visions, the Service Convention allows Contracting States to deviate
from certain provisions of the Convention by way of declaration.177
For example, a party may object to transmission of documents by
mail pursuant to Articles 8 and 10 at the time of ratification or
accession. 
78
It is evident that the Conventions are quite similar and closely
related. Indeed, the fact that they both evolve from Chapter One of
the Hague Conventions on Civil Procedure of 1905 and 1954 presents
the possibility that the two Conventions could have easily been
merged into one. However, individuality has presented problems for
the American courts. Problems have arisen concerning the questions
of scope and mandatory use of the Convention procedures.
A comparison of the first paragraph of Article 1 of each Conven-
tion which defines the scope of each treaty, suggests that each Con-
vention was intended to be mandatory. To quote first from the Hague
Service Convention: "The present Convention shall apply in all cases,
in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a
judicial or extra-judicial document for service abroad."' 79 Now to
quote from the Evidence Convention:
In civil or commercial matters a judicial authority of a Con-
tracting State may, in accordance with the provisions of the law of
that state, request the competent authority of another Contracting
State by means of a Letter of Request, to obtain evidence, or to
175. Hague Service Convention, supra note 32, art. 2, par. 1.
176. Id. at arts. 2-16.
177. Id. at art. 21.
178. Id.
179. Id. at art. 1.
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perform some other judicial act.' 80
First of all, it should be noted that American courts have uni-
formly held that the Hague Service Convention is mandatory and its
provisions for service of process abroad must be followed by United
States litigants.' 81 Thus, the paradox is why American courts have
seen fit to hold that the Hague Evidence Convention is optional.182
American courts, aside from using their jurisdiction-based analy-
sis to preclude the use of the Convention procedures, have distin-
guished that language used in the two Conventions to emphatically
assert the the Service Convention is mandatory while the Evidence
Convention is not. The cases appear to emphasize the language in
Article 1. In that Article, the Service Convention uses the term
"shall" and the Evidence Convention uses "may."1 83 It is this au-
thor's position that the use of the term "may" in the Hague Evidence
Convention in no way signified an intention of the drafters to create
an international agreement designed to be permissive or optional.
That would constitute an exercise in futility. The use of the word
"may" in the Evidence Convention is merely an appropriate use of the
English language. A close reading of the Conventions discloses that
the Scope Article, Article 1 of the Service Convention, precedes the
first chapter, while in the Evidence Convention, Article 1 is in the first
chapter, which is the chapter dealing with Letters of Request. Conse-
quently, to say that the parties "may" use Chapter One is consistent
with the structure of the Convention which allows for two other per-
mitted alternatives. Furthermore, the use of the term "may" is
merely consistent with a general principle of international law, recog-
nized by the Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations, which re-
quires that service and evidence gathering abroad be done in
accordance with the other State's consent. 84 Thus, the Evidence
Convention is merely a grant of permission to the Contracting Parties
to utilize the Letter of Request procedure. Other procedures may be
utilized if permitted by the state of execution.
180. Hague Service Convention, supra note 10, at art. 1.
181. De James v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 286-90 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1085 (1981) (dictum); Low v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, A. G., 88 A.D.2d 504, 449
N.Y.S.2d 733 (1982); Dr. Ing. H.C.F. Porche v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 177
Cal. Rptr. 155 (1981); Cintron v. W & D Machinery Co., Inc., 182 N.J. Super. 126, 440 A.2d
76 (1981); Kadota v. Hogsai, 125 Ariz. 131, 608 P.2d 68 (Ariz. App. 1980).
182. See supra notes 113-36 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co. GMBH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
184. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, Chapter 7 introductory note at 385.
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In conclusion, there appears to be no rational basis for differenti-
ating between the two Conventions by reason of the terminology used
in the opening articles. For American courts to pull such words and
phrases out of the Hague Evidence Convention in order to distinguish
it from the Service Convention is clearly contrary to the negotiation
history and the intent of the parties. Although United States courts
have interpreted the Evidence Convention to be nonexclusive, a re-
view of the judicial treatment of the Convention as set forth above
discloses that it is not international law considerations but domestic
notions of in personam jurisdiction that play the most important role
in such determinations. What follows is an analysis of the interna-
tional law considerations which supports the conclusion that the
agreed procedures must be utilized by United States litigants seeking
evidence abroad regardless of whether the witness is subject to the in
personam jurisdiction of a United States court.
IX. INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
A. Introduction
To summarize the evolution of the judicial treatment of the
Hague Evidence Convention by American courts, it is evident from
the foregoing discussion that current decisions have transcended the
initial level of treaty analysis, that is, whether the Convention proce-
dures apply to the discovery of evidence abroad. The Anschuetz deci-
sion and the cases that have followed it clearly answered that question
in the affirmative, but created various jurisdiction-based exceptions to
the taking of depositions and the production of documents:
We hold that the Hague Convention is to be employed with the
involuntary deposition of a party conducted in a foreign country,
and with the production of documents or other evidence gathered
from persons or entities in the foreign country who are not subject
to the court's in personam jurisdiction. The Hague Convention has
no application at all to the production of evidence in this country
from a party subject to the jurisdiction of a district court pursuant
to the Federal Rules.... 185
This form of limited judicial analysis ignores international law consid-
erations in the interpretation and application of the Hague Evidence
Convention. Accepted rules of treaty interpretation, statutory con-
185. Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 615.
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struction, international jurisdiction and comity analysis not only con-
tribute to our understanding of the Convention, but should be applied
to round out a complete judicial analysis of any international agree-
ment. Indeed, the present jurisdicition-based analysis of our domestic
courts is void of a discussion of territorial limitations which we afford
our own domestic litigants.1
86
B. Rules of Treaty Interpretation
The United States Supreme Court has recently affirmed the rule
that the intent or expectation of the signatories to a treaty is the over-
riding consideration in the interpretation and application of that
treaty. 187 Indeed, the intent or purpose of the treaty would even over-
ride its language. 18 8 It could be strongly argued that since jurisdic-
tional considerations were not covered in the treaty, the Hague
Evidence Convention was intended to be primarily concerned with
the territorial or geographical location of the evidence sought to be
obtained. In other words, regardless of whether or not a Contracting
State has jurisdiction, in personam or otherwise, over a party, it is the
location of the evidence that controls. 8 9 There is nothing in the
treaty language or negotiating history that could contradict such an
assertion. This is especially true in light of the extensive negotiating
history that is available in English which emphasized the accommo-
dation made by the civil law Contracting Parties to United States
methods of discovery in the treaty as emphasized in the explanatory
report, 190 and the language in the history of the treaty that empha-
sizes that methods of discovery must be "tolerable" to requested par-
ties. 19' This position is further supported by the commentary of Mr.
Phillip Amram where he emphasized that one of the overriding pur-
186. See, e.g., Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. KOA Fire & Marine Ins., 572 F. Supp. 962
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (agent not subject to personal jurisdiction in state where corporate principal
does business); Ryder Truck Rental v. Action Food Servs. Corp., 554 F. Supp. 277 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (action of subsidiary does not automatically subject parent to personal jurisdiction); for
U.S. Supreme Court cases recognizing territorial limitations of jurisdiction, see Kulko v. Supe-
rior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
187. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
188. Id. at 180.
189. The Convention's purpose and scope was defined as the taking of evidence "abroad."
No party or jurisdictional exception was included in the text at the Convention. 23 U.S.T.
2555.
190. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
191. See Explanatory Report, supra note 46.
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poses of the Convention was to protect against any "infringement of
sovereignty" of a Contracting Party:
In countries where the performance of a "judicial act" is histori-
cally a monopoly of the courts, taking of testimony other than by
court pursuant to a Letter of Request may be treated as an in-
fringement of sovereignty and may be even criminal in nature. It
was therefore necessary to include in the Convention provisions to
permit a state at the time of signature or ratification to file a reser-
vation with respect to the power of consuls, commissioners, and
private parties to take testimony on its territory. The Convention,
in this aspect, is skillfully drawn. If a signatory initially files a res-
ervation and if its public policy later changes, it can withdraw the
reservation, without the need of any amendment or change in the
Convention and without the need to call another international con-
ference. The Convention represents a substantial breakthrough in
common law and civil law relationships and its operation will be
watched with the greatest interest by all persons interested in the
development in international private law.
192
Another accepted rule of treaty interpretation is that courts are
to give great weight to interpretations of the treaty given by agencies
of government charged with the negotiation and enforcement of the
treaty. 193 Recent briefs filed by the Solicitor General offer evidence
that both the Departments of State and Justice favor the utilization of
the Hague Evidence Convention procedures in obtaining foreign evi-
dence from the United States forum. 194 Current judicial analysis ap-
pears to view these briefs as a source of secondary authority as
opposed to the view of the executive branch. 95
In addition, it is appropriate to look to the rules of treaty inter-
pretation found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
which, although not ratified by the United States, is viewed by com-
mentators as stating 96 or largely restating, 19 7 customary international
192. Amram, United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 107 (1973).
193. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. at 184-85.
194. See briefs submitted by the U.S. Solicitor General in Club Mediterran6e Dorin, No.
83-461, reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1332 (1984), and Volkswagenwerk Aktien-
gesellschaft v. Falzon, 464 U.S. 811 (1983), reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 412
(1984) [hereinafter Falzon].
195. Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 605.
196. See Koh, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine Re-
flects World Vision, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71, 95 (1982); see also Weinberger v. Rossi, 102 S.
Ct. 1510 (1982).
197. I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 6 (2d ed. 1984).
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law in the world. The Vienna Convention instructs that treaties are to
be construed in light of their purpose. 198 That treaties are considered
binding' 99 and to be performed in good faith.2°° Any ambiguities as
to the interpretation of the Convention are to be resolved by looking
to the practice of the Contracting Parties.20 1 Concerning the latter
rule, it appears that the French, German, Swiss, U.K., and Italian
governments view the Hague Evidence Convention to be exclusive.
20 2
C. Rules of Statutory Construction
Contrary to the German view of international law, which consid-
ers it to be paramount and supercede national law,20 3 the United
States Federal Courts view international law to be on equal footing
with federal statutory law.2°4 But the domestic rule is clear that, in
the event of a conflict between a statute and a treaty, or in this case
the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the latter in time shall prevail. 205 Also, there is a rule of statu-
tory construction that a special law controls a general one, the Hague
Evidence Convention being the special one and the Federal Rules be-
ing general. 20 6 Lastly, the supremacy clause of the United States Con-
stitution dictates that a treaty supercedes any conflicting state law,
20 7
which raises the potential problem of inconsistency if the Convention
were to apply at the state level and not at the federal.
D. Comity Considerations
A proper comity analysis in decisions interpreting the Hague Ev-
idence Convention is either lacking from existing court decisions or
insufficient. 20 8 Any expressed comity analysis by courts in their con-
198. Id., art. 31, at 691-92.
199. Id., art. 26, at 690.
200. Id.
201. Id., art. 31(3)(b), at 692.
202. See supra note 134; see also Current Developments, The 1980 French Law on Docu-
ments and Information, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382 (1981); see also Falzon, supra note 186, at 419-
20 (letter from West German Embassy in Washington to the Department of State).
203. See Frei, supra note 168, at 796.
204. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 135, reporters note no. 1, at 81.
205. Id.
206. See Anschuetz,The Heirarchy of the Sources of International Law, XLVII BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 273, 273 (1974-75).
207. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1941).
208. See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co. GMBH, 754 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir. 1985); Work v.
Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 45 (D.D.C. 1985). Principles of comity do not apply within the context
of the interpretation and application of a treaty, in that such principles have been absorbed
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sideration of the Hague Evidence Convention appears to place most
weight on the interest of United States litigants which results in a
distortion of the doctrine.2°9 Indeed, there are three interests involved
in a proper comity analysis. The three areas of interest include "the
interest of the forum state, the interest of the foreign state, and the
interest of international relations in general. ' 210 It is the final interest
which is central to a proper comity analysis: 21'
[T]he central precept of comity teaches that, when possible, the
decisions of foreign tribunals should be given effect in domestic
courts, since recognition fosters international cooperation and en-
courages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability
through satisfaction of mutual expectations. The interests of both
forums are advanced-the foreign court because its laws and poli-
cies have been vindicated; the domestic country because interna-
tional cooperation and ties have been strengthened. The rule of
laws is also encouraged, which benefits all nations.212
It is this type of comity analysis with the emphasis on improving
and protecting international relations which is lacking in most Hague
Evidence Convention cases. In this author's view, a proper comity
analysis in the interest of international cooperation should replace the
current jurisdiction-based analysis which currently impedes the appli-
cation of the Hague Evidence Convention.
E. Jurisdictional Considerations
Courts tend to justify the avoidance of Hague Evidence Conven-
tion procedures when a foreign natural person subject to their in per-
sonam jurisdiction is a party to the litigation. 213 However, most cases
involve the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign artifi-
cial person in the form of a corporation or corporate subsidiary. 21 4 In
order to avoid the Hague Evidence procedures it is incumbent upon
into the treaty which constitutes a binding contract between the states signatory thereto. See
Heck, supra note 159, at 797. Most American courts still appear to include a comity analysis
in Hague Evidence Convention cases and as a consequence a consideration of such principles is
included in this paper.
209. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
210. Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrikund Eisengieberei v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492 at 505
(1985).
211. Id.
212. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgium World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
213. See, e.g., Work, 106 F.R.D. at 45.
214. See, e.g., In re Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d 729 (1985).
[Vol. 9:17
Hague Evidence Convention
the court to order depositions of employees and the production of
documents located abroad. Whether this is jurisdictionally appropri-
ate on the international plane has been called into question:
It may be argued that the domestication of a foreign corporation
for global discovery purposes is justified because only its United
States assets are thereby put at risk and because the risk is a condi-
tion of doing business here. This argument does not resolve the
underlying question of how that power to order global discovery is
to be exercised to maintain a rational ordering of the international
systems of separate territorial sovereignties in the context of in-
creasing transnational commercial activities. The existence of ju-
risdiction is relative rather than absolute. The notion that
jurisdiction to command appearance before the court "domesti-
cates" the witness of a party for all purposes relative to the litiga-
tion is fallacious. The court should not ignore the foreign
nationality or locus of the witness or evidence.
215
Thus, the question is not whether the United States court has the
power to do what it appears to be doing, but whether it should exer-
cise such power. This again raises questions of international comity
in the interest of international relations and judicial cooperation,
216
together with a need for a broader jurisdictional analysis of the asser-
tion of such prescriptive power on the part of United States courts.
1. Theoretical bases of international jurisdiction: the Restatement
The current source of the theoretical bases for international juris-
diction as applied by United States courts is found in the proposed
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. 217 This newly revised Restate-
ment attempts to restate the law of international jurisdiction as a
blend of United States law and international law. 218 Under interna-
tional law, a state is subject to limitations on its authority in the exer-
cise of its jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate and enforce.
219
Whether or not a United States court can subject a foreign national to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure involves the application of the
power of the court to prescribe such rules of discovery with respect to
that individual. 220 The proposed Restatement recognizes as a rule of
215. Oxman, supra note 99, at 741.
216. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937.
217. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at Part 4.
218. Id. at § 181.
219. Id. at § 401.
220. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 com-
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customary international law that the power of a United States court
to prescribe is limited by a rule of reasonableness. 221 Whether or not
prescriptive jurisdiction is reasonable is dependent upon various fac-
tors as set forth in the Restatement.222 Other sections speak to this
rule of reasonableness and require both interest balancing and a con-
sideration of the possibility of alternative means.223
2. Recent cases and proposed legislation
Recent federal case authority involving the subject of prescriptive
jurisdiction on the international plane is currently in conflict. One
line of cases, led by Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 224 and
Timberline Lumber Co. v. Bank of America 225 support the concept of
interest balancing. This is 'also the proposed restatement's position.
226
The Laker Airways v. Sabena Belgium Airlines decision contrarily re-
jected interest balancing.227 The various considerations and factors to
be considered as set forth in the Mannington Mills case are as follows:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here
compared to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation
there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and
its foreseeability;
ment H (Rev. Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986); see also id. at reporter's note 1; id. at § 437 comments
and reporters notes.
221. Id. at § 403.
222. Id.
223. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, comment
(h) (Rev. Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
224. Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979).
225. Timberline Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976).
226. Commentators have recently criticized interest-balancing within the jurisdictional
context as being an improper function for the courts. See, e.g., Rosenthal, Jurisdictional Con-
flicts Between Foreign Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487 (1985); Sennett & Gavil, Antitrust Jurisdic-
tion, Extraterritorial Conduct, and Interest-Balancing, 19 INT'L LAW. 1185 (1985).
These commentaries are supportive of diplomatic or political solutions to what appears to
be an extraterritorial jurisdictional crisis. Such analysis clearly favors the mandatory utiliza-
tion of the Hague Evidence Convention in the discovery of evidence abroad. The Convention
represents an express diplomatic solution to the problems identified in international evidence
gathering. It is difficult to escape from a natural skepticism concerning the ability of a federal
magistrate to properly balance national interests in cases involving foreign corporate defend-
ants, especially in cases where such corporations are owned by foreign sovereigns. See, e.g., In
re Societ6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986).
227. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises ju-
risdiction and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the posi-
tion of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be
under conflicting requirements by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country
if made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the
issue.
228
The above factors support using the Hague Evidence Convention
to limit the power of United States courts to enforce discovery orders
involving foreign witnesses and evidence when the alternative proce-
dures of a judicial assistance treaty are available. Additionally, this
interest balancing approach, recognized in some federal circuits and
in the proposed Restatement, is found in proposed legislation by Sena-
tor Deconcini entitled: The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act of 198 5.229 The Act proposes a jurisdictional rule of reason man-
dating certain considerations which are borrowed from federal case
authority and the Restatement. The Act mandates consideration of
the following:
(1) The relative significance, to the alleged violation, of conduct
within the United States compared to conduct abroad;
(2) The nationality of the person involved or affected by the con-
duct [and the principal place of business of corporations];
(3) The presence or absence of a purpose to affect U.S. consumers
or competitors;
(4) The relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the
conduct on the United States compared to effects abroad;
(5) The existence of reasonable expectations potentially furthered
or defeated by the actions;
(6) The degree of conflict with foreign law or economic policy;
(7) The effect of the exercise of jurisdiction on international
commerce. 23
0
Comparing the various interest balancing considerations set forth
above emphasizes the important role of law and international agree-
228. Mannington Mills Inc., 595 F.2d at 1297-98 (emphasis added).
229. S. REP. No. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., (1985) as amended by amend. no. 1324, 131
Cong. Rec. § 17,105 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1985).
230. Id.; see also the Reagan Administration Antitrust Reform Package entitled the "For-
eign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1986" which incorporates these factors with the
exception of Number (7). 3 INT'L TRADE REP. 292 (BNA) (1986).
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ments in the rational ordering of our global economy. Because of the
increased importance of international trade to the United States, the
assertion of international jurisdiction by United States courts and its
effect on international commerce are increasingly the predominate
considerations. These considerations emphasized the necessity of in-
ternational agreements providing judicial assistance in an agreed and
orderly fashion.
F. Constitutional and Foreign Relations Considerations
Mutual judicial assistance treaties, especially regarding evidence
gathering, involve sensitive areas of foreign sovereignty. The courts
must pay close attention to the sensitive nature of the processes in-
volved because the parties to the Hague Evidence Convention are
some of our closest allies. For example, in the recent uranium anti-
trust litigation2 3 1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit was informed by the Departments of State and Justice of the
serious embarrassment caused to the United States Government re-
sulting from some of the language in a recent decision.232 This raises
a question whether our domestic courts are interfering with the role of
the Executive Branch to conduct foreign affairs. Clearly, an appropri-
ate interest balancing will resolve such controversy.
G. Summary of International Law Considerations
The overriding consideration in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Hague Evidence Convention is its purpose and the intent
of the Contracting Parties. Thus, the question arises why the United
States agreed to a treaty restricting its right to seek extraterritorial
discovery from parties over which they assert in personam jurisdic-
tion. The answer to this question is found in the cases and early arti-
cles which recognized that extraterritorial discovery had been
accepted by the United States judiciary for some time, but was viewed
as a violation of international law by our trading partners. Conse-
quently, regardless of our policy and rules, our courts and litigants
have met substantial resistance on foreign soil to United States discov-
ery orders. Thus, just as a body of water seeks the path of least resist-
ance, the United States ratified the Hague Evidence Convention
which was to aid its citizens in the discovery of foreign evidence.
231. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
232. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 665-67 (1980).
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It is also important to ask how other Signing Parties benefit if
United States courts refuse to follow the Convention's procedures.
Consequently, they agreed to liberalize their judicial assistance to for-
eign parties without the intended quid pro quo on the part of United
States courts. Indeed, viewing the Hague Evidence Convention from
a global perspective, it appears to take on a bilateral complexion; the
United States versus the rest of the world.
X. SUGGESTED POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Policy Considerations
The current trend in Hague Evidence Convention decisions in
the United States indicates certain potential serious problems. The
expansion of in personam jurisdiction over witnesses for global discov-
ery purposes could tip the scales in favor of a foreign forum because of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 233 This would cause great ag-
gravation to the segment of the bar that appears to be seeking exemp-
tion from the Hague Evidence Convention. Secondly, failing to abide
by the Hague Evidence Convention procedures, if viewed as exclusive
by other Contracting Parties, could result in a breach of the treaty
and a declaration by other parties that they will not abide by it. This
would result in a loss of the procedures for United States litigants.
Thirdly, current judicial treatment by United States courts will deter
other trading partners, i.e., Japan, Canada, and the People's Republic
of China, from acceding to the Hague Evidence Convention. Lastly,
United States courts should question the potential impact of their fail-
ure to use the Hague Evidence Convention procedures on the validity
of their judgments at home and in foreign countries. This would be




The problem besetting the United States judiciary today concerns
the application of the Hague Evidence Convention to foreign parties.
This could be solved by the promulgation of new judicial assistance
legislation or by amending the Federal Rules. Additionally, the Re-
vised Restatement's timid approach to the problem neutralizes its im-
pact on the judiciary. The Restatement should take a position that
233. See, e.g., Pain v. United Techs. Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
234. See, e.g., Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1982).
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leads the courts in the right direction before a developing body of law
inflicts irreparable injury upon the Hague Evidence Convention.
Lastly, the Departments of State and Justice should take a more ac-
tive role in these decisions by providing letters and briefs stating the
government's position at both the trial and appellate levels.
XI. PRACTICE CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Practice Considerations Before Ignoring the Hague Evidence
Convention Procedures
First of all, consider the possibility of a lengthy hearing and ap-
pellate process by the foreign party who feels that the Hague Evidence
Convention Procedures are exclusive. 235 Another consideration is
that an appellate court may reverse the granting of the trial court's
discovery order for foreign input concerning comity considerations.2
36
Additionally, sanctions in the form of a default judgment would im-
pair the enforceability of the judgment in this country or abroad.
237
The possibility of criminal sanctions in the foreign state if one seeks
evidence contrary to certain statutes is another factor to be consid-
ered.238 Finally, the consequences of the invocation of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens must be looked at. 239
B. Practice Recommendations
In the use of the Hague Evidence Convention, the practitioner
must be specific in the Request to avoid being charged by a foreign
court of going on a "fishing expedition."'"24 Also, the practitioner
should declare the purpose of the Request, which is that the evidence
is to be used at trial. 241 Additionally, he should follow the procedures
of the Hague Evidence Convention to avoid rejection. 242 At the out-
set of the litigation, he should identify all foreign witnesses and docu-
ments that may require the utilization of the Hague Evidence
Convention procedures for deposition or production. 243 If represent-
235. See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co. GMBH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
236. See, e.g., In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GMBH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985).
237. See, e.g., Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1982).
238. B. RISTAU, Overview of International Judicial Assistance, 18 INT'L LAW. 525, 531
(1984).
239. See, e.g., Pain v. United Techs. Corp. 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
240. B. RISTAU, supra note 14, at 234-35.
241. Id. at 235.
242. Id. at 221.
243. Id. at 213.
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ing a foreign party, the practitioner should assert the application of
the Hague Evidence Convention at the outset of the proceeding to
avoid waiver.244 Finally, the practitioner should consider the reten-
tion of foreign counsel to assist the Request or to appear in the foreign
forum.
XII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, that the Hague Evidence Convention was in-
tended to apply to foreign parties ,subject to a court's in personam
jurisdiction is evident from the negotiating history and language of
the Convention. However, this issue is moot today in light of the
overriding considerations of foreign and international economic rela-
tions and the possible negative ramifications from the failure to abide
by the Convention's procedures. 24
5
As was recently recognized by the Honorable Kenneth W. Dam,
former Deputy Secretary of State, the extraterritorial application of
our laws transcends the international law debate:
Controversies over the extraterritorial application of United States
law have taken on increasing importance in our foreign policy. Re-
call the dispute in 1982 over United States sanctions against the
Soviet natural gas pipeline. That problem was resolved, but the
extraterritorial issue has arisen in other contexts. We have had
diplomatic and courtroom clashes with Switzerland, for example,
over foreign evidence production in the Marc Rich case, and with
244. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. British Aerospace, 102 F.R.D. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984).
245. Reflecting the concern of other contracting parties, who are also our closest trading
partners, are these quotes taken from amicus briefs filed in In re Societ6 Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale, - U.S. -, 90 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1986) (No. 85-1695, 1985 Term):
As the economies of nations have become more interdependent, effective mecha-
nisms for cooperation between their different legal systems have become increasingly
important. These mechanisms for cooperation (including treaties, statutes, and ad-
ministrative arrangements), facilitate international business by enhancing the pre-
dictability and enforceability of rules governing transactions across international
boundries.
Transnational enforcement of legal rules can most effectively be achieved when
the sovereignty of all nations is respected. Such respect requires that conflicts be-
tween the legal requirements of nations be avoided or minimized whenever possible.
Brief of the government of Switzerland as amicus curiae;
The governments of the United States, the Republic of France, the United King-
dom, and all other trading nations with developed legal systems have a common
interest in the promotion of international trade and in the orderly and mutually sup-
portive resolution of legal disputes which arise in international commerce. Reducing
international jurisdictional conflicts is a vital national interest of the United States no
less than other nations.
Brief of the United Kingdom as amicus curiae.
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Canada and a number of Carribean jurisdictions in the Bank of
Nova Scotia cases. We have had disputes with other countries over
application of our re-export controls to goods within their jurisdic-
tions. The private Laker antitrust case and the Grand Jury investi-
gation into alleged North Atlantic aviation price-fixing has seized
the attention of the highest levels of the United States and British
governments. Britain has invoked its Protection of Trading Inter-
ests Act to forbid the production in Laker of any documents held
in that country.
As a result of these and other experiences, the United States
government and a number of other governments have dedicated
themselves to a systematic effort to manage the extraterritorial ap-
plication of their law more effectively. The problem naturally
arises most acutely among friends and close trading partners; we
therefore share a powerful interest in not letting the issue do harm
to vital political relationships.
24 6
In sum, the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust
laws and export controls may remain undecided. In the discovery of
documents and evidence from a foreign witness, whether or not a
party is subject to in personam jurisdiction of the court, the Executive
and Legislative Branches have clearly spoken. The interests and the
considerations have been weighed in favor of the negotiation and the
ratification of a valid and binding international agreement intended to
represent the exclusive and preferable alternative to continued expen-
sive and protracted discovery litigation in transnational disputes. For
federal courts to perpetuate this developing controversy not only does
violence to United States and foreign notions of international law, but
also inflicts possibly irreparable harm to United States international
trading relationships. 24 7 Certainly, the trend in federal appellate deci-
sions led by Anschuetz must be reversed.
246. Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality, 19 INT'L LAW. 887, 887-
88 (1985).
247. Id. at 890.
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